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PROSECUTING LOAN SHARKS UNDER THE
MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
STEWART LYNCHt
AMERICANS will be purchasing millions of new automobiles as soon
as the industry converts to civilian production. A recent poll
indicates that the American soldier returned from the wars, as well as
the shipbuilder, the miner, the farmer, and other war workers who served
on the home front, at the earliest possible time, will go shopping for a
new car. Many will be in a financial position to make the purchase
without undue difficulty. Many others, however, not so fortunate and
hungry for long-absent luxuries, will satisfy the need or the desire for
quick acquisition of a new automobile without regard for the future
effect upon the family budget. This state of affairs will provide ideal
breeding and hunting grounds for the automobile loan shark.
Just prior to Pearl Harbor, the United States Attorney for the District
of Delaware, sought to curtail the activities of a group of extraordinarily
cunning and unscrupulous automobile loan sharks by a criminal prosecu-
tion under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute. The results were satisfactory
in that convictions on guilty pleas resulted. Fines exceeding $50,000.00
were levied and paid. Those involved faded from the scene and it is
reported that they retired from the field of automobile lending.
Since the shark swims closest to the surface in warm seas, it is be-
lieved that a discussion of the problem in general, and of that prose-
cution in particular, may now be very timely, and especially because
returning service men and women afford a fruitful field for such illicit
operations.
The etymology of the term "loan shark" is not difficult to understand.
The piscivorous scavenger of the deep has its counterpart in the scaven-
ger money-lender who preys upon indigent borrowers and exacts unlaw-
ful and unconscionable profits from that class of people who, as a result
of limited financial resources are frequently in need of small loan credit.
The need for such credit is often based on emergency and misery.
It has been estimated that prior to the war the average American family
required financial assistance of some kind every two years. The loan
shark has no regard for the disastrous economic effect of his illegally
high rates or of his constant attempt to keep borrowers in debt by
encouraging renewals, and by making difficult the payment of the prin-
cipal of the obligation. He is the unregulated and unlicensed Shylock.
He is the bootlegger of the financial world.
t Former United States Attorney for the District of Delaware.
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At the outset, it is important that the difference between the boot-
legger and the legal lender of small loans be distinguished. The licensed
lender must not be dubbed "loan shark". The legal lender of small
loans carries on his business under regulations imposed by state laws.
In almost every state the applicant must establish with the licensing
official (a) that his financial responsibility, experience, character and
fitness . . . are such as to command the confidence of the community
and to warrant belief that the applicant will operate his business honest-
ly, fairly, efficiently and within the purposes of the law; and (b) that
granting his application will promote the convenience and advantage of
the community.1
The legal lender of small loans operates under a state license and he
is examined periodically by state banking authorities. He fulfills a need
among wage-earners for a loan service similar to that which is available
to businessmen. It is the unlicensed and unregulated money-lender, and
not the legal lender of small loans, who "serves you in the present tense,
lends you in the conditional mood, keeps you in the subjunctive and
ruins you in the future".
Since the first decade of the present century, there has been a growing
awareness of the anti-social character of the loan shark. Although he
has been operating for centuries, always unscrupulous, usually illegally,
it has been only in the past few decades that legislators, labor leaders,
law-enforcement officers and public service groups have full realized
the real danger to the economic welfare of tens of thousands of wage-
earners of America. The enormity of the evil was demonstrated by a
recent survey which indicated that the operations of the unregulated
lender of small loans increased two-fold during the period 1933 to 1939.
Shark fishermen have, in recent years, devised an ingenious hypo-
dermic harpoon as an effective weapon with which to catch the fish.
The legal "harpoon" for use against loan sharks in general, and auto-
mobile loan sharks in particular, has not yet been perfected. Most
states have some kind of legislation intended to curb the activities of
loan sharks, but the effectivenbss of such legislation varies. Such legis.
lation is usually in the form of usury laws and statutes regulating small
loans.
Generally speaking, usury laws are non-effective' because they pro-
vide inadequate penalties and because they rely upon action by the indi-
vidual borrower rather than by public officers. The problem has not
1. Section 4 of Model Small Loan Act sponsored by Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
2. Horack, A Survey of the General Usuary Laws (1941) 8 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
36-53. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject of loan sharks, the entire issue of
the periodical mentioned above is recommended.
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become less difficult with the development of modern transportation and
communication. Usury has always presented a seemingly unsolvable
problem to lawmakers and to law-interpreters. I am not at all convinced
that the problem is as difficult as it has been presented. I submit that
usury can be curbed by a criminal statute that is administered by prose-
cuting officers who come to recognize the misery that usury causes. It
is believed that most state usury laws are wholly inadequate to deal
with the inter-state type of organization through which the big twentieth
century loan shark operates.
State statutes generally provide only for forfeiture of interest pay-
ments and at best void the entire contract.3 Moreover, the courts have
held that charges which purported to be other than interest charges
would not be added to interest charges to constitute a usurious rate.4
The criminal aspects of usury statutes ordinarily have no validity be-
yond state borders.5 Thus, it would be a practical impossibility to
curtail the central activities of a loan shark organization located in a
state other than the state in which usury laws are being violated by
local resident managers unless the law of the sister states avoided the
usurious contract.
Small loan statutes are often without effect because of deficiencies
in the law or inadequate enforcement by prosecuting officers. The pur-
pose of small loan laws is to protect needy borrowers of small sums,
and not simply to limit the profits of the money-lender.
The primary purpose of small loan laws is to protect the burdens of
the indigent borrower and to furnish the wage-earner of limited credit
standing with an opportunity of borrowing, when necessary, through a
system of regulated lenders. In many jurisdictions, the small loan law,
enacted with this worthy purpose in mind, failed to fulfill the purpose.
Generally it is but a misdemeanor at the most to loan money at a rate
in excess of the legal rate.6 Where they exist at all, the penalties are
grossly inadequate-a small fine or imprisonment for a short period, or
both. Moreover insurance charges, about which more will be said later,
have been recognized as legitimate charges in connection with a loan,
3. Id. at 36-53.
4. Mintz v. Hornblower and Weeks, 83 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. den.,
299 U. S. 561 (1936); Lyttle v. Mathews Inv. Co., 193 Ark. 849, 103 S. W. (2d) 47 (1937) ;
In re Fuller, 15 Cal. (2d) 425, 102 P. (2d) 321 (1940); James Bradford Co. v. United
Leather Co., 11 Del. Chan. 46, 95 AtI. 308 (Ch. 1914); Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305,
166 So. 847 (1936); First .National Bank v. Phares, 70 Okla. 255, 174 Pac. 519 (1918);
James v. Davis, 150 S. W. (2d) 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
5. 2 WHARToN, CoN-micrs op LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 511b.
6. See note 2 supra.
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with a few restrictions.7 In addition, certain credit transactions do not
fall within the scope of many of the acts.8 To the corporate syndicated
automobile shark, dealing in thousands of transactions daily involving
hundreds of thousands of dollars, the penalty imposed for violation of
such statutes does not constitute a deterrent. Strong sanctions must be
provided and imposed.
Through 1938 and 1939, in the area comprising Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia and the District of
Columbia, also across the Pennsylvania State Lines into Ohio, New York
and New Jersey, extremely tempting offers to loan money were being
made to registered owners of automobiles by several newly organized
credit and auto finance companies. From their names, it would appear
that these companies were independent of one another, yet their cam-
paigns for luring victims were suspiciously similar. Each had a talent
for lending money at spiral rates, and each solicited business by enticing
disarming invitations of like phraseology.
Automobiles owners, residing in that area, received "credit cards"
through the mail from one company or another. Such cards and accom-
panying advertising matter informed the automobile owner that since
he was of a "limited type of person" Whose "credit had been approved",
he was eligible to receive a loan upon the security of his automobile
at a "low" and "lawful" tate of interest. Assurances were made that
applicants for loans would need "no endorsers" or "co-makers", and that
no investigations would be made.
The scope and effectiveness of the scheme underlying such invitations
can best be demonstrated by some of the cases developed by the Post
Office Inspectors at Philadelphia and at Wilmington, Delaware.
Mr. A,' a resident of Delaware, after receipt of a credit card by mail,
visited the office of AA Credit Co. in Wilmington, Delaware. He re-
quested a loan on his automobile, and was granted a loan of $63.00-
the maximum the company would allow on the vehicle. He was required
to sign a conditional sales contract, in blank, conveying the automobile,
and a note for $98.10, the total amount of his indebtedness to the com-
pany. No mention was made to him of insuring his car; indeed, it
would seem unnecessary since he already carried insurance.
Later, Mr. A received advice, through the mails, that his "lien instru-
7. State v. Bankers Finance Corp., 81 Del. 566, 26 A. (2d) 220 (1942).
S. OR City Motor Co. v. C. I. T. Corp., 76 F. (2d) 589, 104 A. L. R. 240, 245 (C. C. A.
10th, 1935).
9. For reasons that will be apparent, no mention is made of the true names of persons
who cooperated with the investigators; nor have the names of the companies been used
as there are other companies operating with the same or similar names, and such course is
taken to spare them any possible embarrassment.
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ment" and his note had been "assigned" to the AAA Credit and Dis-
count Company of Philadelphia. A copy of his conditional sales con-
tract, which accompanied this advice, informed him that there was in-
surance in force on his automobile for the period of one year. Mr. A
had made only two payments to the AAA Credit and Discount Company
of Philadelphia when he received notice from the AAAA Finance Com-
pany of Wilmington, Delaware, that his account had been "assigned"
to it. By this time, however, state and federal authorities had become
interested in the whole entangled web, and Mr. A was advised to make
no further payments to anyone.
Ultimately the investigation made at the offices of the parent XXX
Company in Philadelphia, disclosed Mr. A's loan and records revealed
the following breakdown of the obligation upon which Mr. A was paying:
$63.00 Principal
1.96 Reserve for Dealer
6.65 Dealer's Commission
28.49 AAA Credit & Discount's charge,
plus 8% on the loan.
The investigation also disclosed that no insurance of any type had
ever been placed on Mr. A's automobile by any of the named companies.
The legal charges on Mr. A's loan would have been $5.02-8% on the
actual money advanced."0 The charges exacted by the lending compa-
nies amounted to approximately 50% simple interest, or based on a
systematic and regular periodic reduction of the loan by equal monthly
installments, the charges approximated 100%.
Citizens of Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania fell victims to an-
other angle of the game. This particular angle involved the usual loan
on the security of an automobile for which a charge far in excess of
the legal rate of interest, plus investigation or service charges was levied.
The gullible victims were told by the managers of the lending companies
that the difference represented the cost of insurance upon their cars.
Actually, the lending companies either took out no insurance at all
or acquired extensions of existing insurance policies for small sums
10. Section 1, Chapter 77, Rev. Code of Del., 1935, fixes 6% as the maximum lawful
rate of interest. Section 152 of Chapter 100 permits a lender of money in sums not
exceeding $500.00 and repayable in installments, to charge in advance the legal rate of
interest of six per centum upon the entire amount of the loan and an investigation or
service fee not exceeding two per centum of the amount of the loan. The Court of Chan-
cery in Agostini, et al. v. Colonial Trust Co., 36 A. (2d) 33 (Del. Ch. 1944) held that




-negligible in comparison to the amount which they charged the victims
for them.
Refinancing of these loans provided the lending companies with further
opportunities to kite the charges still higher with additional bogus in-
surance policies. One victim refinanced his loan three times and in
the course of a few years borrowed approximately $960 for which he
obligated himself to pay about $412 in addition to the principal bor-
rowed. Investigations of these loans resulted in the discovery that
although financed by apparently competing companies, these companies
were in fact controlled by the parent XXX Company where records of
the loans in question were uncovered.
The mass of evidence collected by the Post Office Inspectors included
many other cases of extreme sharp practices and highly illegal and
-unscrupulous operations. The several examples set forth above, how-
ever, were typical, and suffice to outline the manner in which indi-
viduals in need of small loans were victimized daily. The evidence
revealed a central company and many subsidiary companies, all con-
trolled by the Doe Organization.
The operations of this group of loan sharks came to the attention
of the United States Attorney's office and of the United States Postal
Inspection Service after state prosecution in both Delaware and Mary-
land had failed to eliminate the group. The State Banking Commissioner
of Delaware, called at the office of the United States Attorney and urged
action. The Post Office Inspectors carried out a long and thorough
investigation and, bit by bit, the organization of the syndicate and the
scheme under which the operations were carried out begau to take form.
The final pieces to the puzzle were furnished in the course of extensive
Grand Jury investigation by a manager of two of the companies who
became fearful of federal prosecution.
As stated above, the various credit companies involved purported to
be independent; yet it was fairly obvious that a tie existed between
them-if only in the recurring appearance of the parent XXX Company.
It was demonstrated that operations centered in Philadelphia where the
Doe Brothers had offices, and operated the XXX Company and other
-companies. It developed that their procedure was to open what were
actually branch offices, purporting to be locally operated credit compa-
nies, in various cities throughout Pennsylvania, Delaware, the Eastern
Shore of Maryland and the District of Columbia. Managers of these
local offices were instructed to list all the registered automobile owners
in their districts and to send to each such owner a credit card, which
-was furnished from the Philadelphia office. Sometimes these cards were
:mailed direct from the Philadelphia office to the local automobile owners;
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other cards were prepared in Philadelphia but were sent from the local
offices.
These credit cards, with accompanying advertising matter, carried
all the disarming and inviting phraseology previously mentioned and
they urged the prospective victim to borrow money not only to meet
current expenses but to refinance or "centralize" loans already incurred
with other credit companies. When the victim appeared at the local
credit office to exercise his "special privilege", he was silently investi-
gated, while he waited his automobile was inspected, and the amount
of money he could borrow on the security of his car was determined
from a chart supplied from the Philadelphia office. The borrower was
required to sign, usually in blank, a loan application, conditional sales
contract, car assignment, and a demand promissory note. He then re-
ceived his money, usually drawn on a local bank by the loan company.
It was noted that the borrower was always charged for insurance at
a flat rate, designated on charts also furnished by the home office, and
not according to the age, type or condition of the automobile as is
customary. The charge for interest quoted to borrowers was usually
at the maximum legal rates in the particular state involved. The remain-
der of the charges, the borrower was told, was to pay for insurance.
Actually most of it represented charges for the use of the money loaned
in the transaction. The "insurance charge" varied with the amount of
the loan and was always greatly in excess of manual rates. In most
cases, no insurance whatsoever was ever placed on the car; in other
cases, partial coverage was furnished when the charges and the repre-
sentations to the borrower indicated full coverage; in all cases, payment
of insurance premiums was a condition of the loan, notwithstanding the
fact that the borrower may already have had full coverage on his car.
It was discovered that after the loan had been thus negotiated by
the local office, it was assigned, with all rights and privileges, to either
the XXX Company or to another of its companies in Philadelphia. In
due course of time, the borrower received through the mails notice of
the assignment, and accompanying this notice was a copy of complete
sales contract. In the notice, attention was always invited to the fictitious
insurance allegedly in force for which most of the charges were exacted.
Often, also, there was a separate notice, sent by way of the mails,
falsely specifying the insurance which had been taken out on the debtor's
automobile.
Such was the organization and the operation of the scheme of this
great syndicate of loan sharks. It was clear that money was being ob-
tained under false pretenses, that fraud was being perpetrated, and that




The question was how to strike at the heart of this organization and
-end its nefarious existence in view of the fact that efforts by state prose-
cutions under usury and small loan statutes to halt its operations had
utterly failed. Since the mails were used so frequently in each trans-
action, the answer seemed to lie in Section 338 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, Section 215 of the Criminal Code which provides that:
"Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises . . . shall, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed,
any letter, postal card . . . writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement . . .
in any post office,.... of the United States ... to be sent or delivered by the
post office establishment of the United States, or shall take or receive any
such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United States, or shall
knowingly cause to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon,
-or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such letter, postal card . . . writing, circular, pamphlet,
or advertisement, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
The purpose of the Mail Fraud Statute has been stated to be the pro-
tection of the public against all "intentional efforts to despoil", and to
prevent the United States mails from being utilized to carry such efforts
into effect. It was enacted to "prevent prostitution of the mails of the
United States in furtherance of dishonest schemes". It stands as the
legal instrument to be employed to "protect the use of the post office
establishment in furtherance of schemes to defraud others of their
money and property". Making false promises to obtain things of value
and using the mails to effectuate the fraudulent scheme is expressly
prohibited by this Statute. The scheme to defraud denounced by the
Statute may be found in "any plan to get the money or property of
.others by deceiving them as to the substantial identity of the thing
which they are to receive in exchange, and the deception may be by
implication as well as by express words."
In the case under consideration; it was clear that a scheme had been
devised for obtaining money through illegal charges for loans, by falsely
representing that the charges were for insurance. The mails were used
in executing the scheme in that credit cards were issued inviting the
public into the places of business where the scheme was executed and
other mailed matter confirmed and repeated the false representations.
This constituted a violation of the Statute." The deception was both
11. Kaufman v. United States, 282 Fed. 776 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
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by implication as well as by express words.12 The scheme also involved
getting money by making promises which there was no intention to
perform, and, as such, was within the Mail Fraud Statute.
1 3
A full analysis of the scheme indicated an insurance racket as well
as a small loan racket. But even if this insurance racket had been
operated alongside of a legitimate business, it would not be redeemed
thereby. The Statute condemns schemes to defraud, even though car-
ried out in connection with an established business otherwise honestly
conducted.1" It is not necessary that a scheme should be fraudulent
on its face; even though the defendant is apparently in a legitimate
business, he falls within the Statute, if there was an intention not to
conduct such business honestly, but to use it as a cloak to defraud."
Notwithstanding the apparent applicability of the foregoing principles
enumerated in connection with the Mail Fraud Statute to the operations
of these loan sharks, this law had been used in a similar situation but
once before. 6 There a mutual loan society advertised through the mails
that all those joining and making payments for six months would be
eligible for loans at 5% at the end of that period. The misrepresentation
lay in the contract subsequently signed, which provided the association
would lend at 5% only when and if funds were available and in order
of date of membership.
The cases of United States v. Buckner, et al.,"7 United States v. Groves,
et al.,"8 and Weiss v. United States"9 were similar to our case in this
one respect,-they also involved otherwise legitimate businesses engag-
ing in fraudulent practices amounting to a scheme to defraud and using
of the mails to effectuate the fraudulent practices.
In spite of lack of precedent and the open question as to the authority
of these cited cases for a loan shark prosecution, it was felt that the
points of the case fitted so well into the legal requirements to obtain a
conviction under the Mail Fraud Statute that it was considered safe
to proceed under that law to obtain indictments.
In prosecuting the practices set out above, the false representations
made in carrying out the scheme to defraud, as alleged in the indictment,
numbered fourteen. They can be condensed for the purpose of this
paper to center around five principal points:
12. Harrison v. United States, 200 Fed. 662 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
13. United States v. Comyns, 248 U. S. 349 (1919).
14. Sparks v. United States, 241 Fed. 777 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
15. McConkey v. United States, 171 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
16. Whitehead et al. v. United States, 245 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917).
17. 108 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. den., 309 U. S. 669 (1940).
18. 122 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), cert. den., 314 D. S. 670 (1941).
19. 122 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cert. den., 314 U. S. 678 (1941).
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1. That each branch office was independent and locally organized,
while in reality it had been initiated, financed, managed and was at all
times in close contact with and under domination of and control from
Philadelphia.
2. That the persons to whom credit cards were sent were of a limited
and preferred type whose credit had been proven and who were, there-
fore, granted special privileges, when really the cards were sent indis-
criminately to names appearing on the state lists of automobile owners;
there were no special privileges existing. Anybody who had an auto-
mobile and who applied for a loan, regardless of his having previously
received one of the cards mentioned above or not, could get a loan.
3. That there would be no investigation of the applicant for loans,
whe4 actually each credit office intended to and did conduct an investiga-
tion. of each person seeking a loan.
4. That the interest rate on the loan would be at the lowest and
lawful rate, when the charges for the use of the money were far above
the legal limit that could be charged as interest.
5. That all cars would be insured for fire, theft and burglary, when
actually most cars were never insured at all.
But let it not be thought that those accused succumbed without a
struggle. They advanced many defenses to the Government's conten-
tion that the Mail Fraud Statute was being violated. Since the insur-
ance angle was the most virulent artifice by which the illegal profits
were made, most of the arguments centered around attacking or defend-
ing the character of this representation:
1. It was argued that the loan companies had general credit which
supported any insurance which was supposed to have been effected.
Granting such statement to be true, the victims in these cases were
led to believe that they were being furnished with insurance taken out
with an insurance company. The prosecution took the position that
insurance means more than a right of action against the general credit
of even a highly reputable corporation. The victims were told they
would receive insurance, for which they paid extravagantly, when, in
fact, most received no such protection. This certainly seemed to amount
to a "... scheme or artifice to defraud" or the "... obtaining [of]
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. .. .
2. It was urged that no borrower suffered damage because the
insurance was not furnished as represented. But, it is not necessary that
anyone actually suffer a loss in order to constitute the crime of using
the mails to defraud.2° It is not even necessary that the scheme result
20. Schauble v. United States, 40 F. (2d) 363 (C C. A. 8th, 1930).
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in gain to the perpetrator. 21 The borrower, however, may be said to
have suffered financial detriment in that he was obliged to pay exorbi-
tant amounts for insurance which, in most cases, was never furnished.
3. It was contended by the loan sharks that the XXX Company
was actually operating under. a type of hazard dgreement' by which
they relieved the automobile owners from personal liability on the
loan in return for the payment of a fiat sum of money. Hazard agree-
ments are old in the law and are often used to provide protection to
lenders where insurance companies refuse to underwrite the risk. But,
as was pointed out by the prosecution, hazard agreements were used
only in loans originating in Virginia and only occasionally in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Any justification for the fiat rate exorbitant "insurance"
charges which might come out of such a hazard agreement was of no
effect in Delaware, in Maryland and in the District of Columbia, because
hazard agreements were not used there. Insurance was promised and
paid for, and insurance was not forthcoming. Therefore, it was urged
by the Government there was fraud under the Statute.
4. It was contended that the insurance was merely for the benefit
of the holders of the collateral, the lenders, and, therefore, there was
no detriment or deception to the borrower. The notes signed by each
borrower created a personal obligation, and the title of the automobile
was merely posted as collateral. The insurance contemplated by the
borrower was intended to cover his automobile and was as much for his
benefit as it was for the benefit of the lender since it was for fire, theft
and collision. Under such a policy, the equity of the borrower would be
covered by insurance, as well as aiiy interest the lender might have at
the time of a loss.
5. It was also maintained that the credit cards made no mention
of insurance and that, therefore, they could not be tied into the scheme
of charging premiums for insurance which was never intended to be
effected. The credit cards merely stated that loans were made at the
"lowest" and "lawful" rates.
This last was true. A breakdown of the charges, shown by the records
maintained in the Philadelphia office, disclosed that the interest rates
charged were 6%o and 2%-the lawful rates. But, it was contended by
the Government that the contents of the credit card were immaterial as
long as they were used as a part of the plan in execution of the scheme.
Letters mailed in execution of a scheme to defraud need not disclose
21. Linn v. United States, 234 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916).
22. The hazard agreement was used in Virginia. Van Dyke v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 178 Va. 418, 17 S. E. (2d) 336 (1941).
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any fraudulent representations or purpose,23 and false statements in the
letter written in aid of the scheme are not essential.24 The credit cards
mailed need not even have been of a nature calculated to be effective
in carrying out the fraudulent scheme, because as was stated in Durland
v. United States:2 5
"It is enough if, having devised a scheme to defraud, the defendant with a
view of executing it, deposits in the post Office letters, which.he thinks may
assist in carrying it into effect, although in the judgment of the jury they
may be absolutely ineffective therefor."
The Doe organization had counsel wise enough to recognize the sound-
ness of the prosecution's reasoning. They realized that here was a new
weapon raised against them *which could not be blunted by the old
dependable strategies previously utilized against state laws. A plea of
guilty was finally entered by the companies and the court imposed fines
in excess of $50,000.
One of the more interesting questions raised by this whole subject
was the question whether a scheme to exact usuriou§ rates26 constitutes,
in and of itself, such a scheme to defraud as is prohibited under the
Mail Fraud Statute. Before the insurance misrepresentations had been
fully uncovered the prosecution contemplated founding its action upon
such a theory; it is believed that prosecution on that basis alone would
have been successful, although an opinion of the. Supreme Court, noted
hereafter, raises some doubt thereon.
Equity has long treated exorbitant interest rates as being of a fraudu-
lent nature. Bispham, Pomeroy and Story, in their 'various works on
Equity, all considered "usury a fraud-Story going so far as to say that
the usury law is "a statute made to prevent fraud". 7 Considerable case
law may also be found to support the view that usury is fraudulent.
2 8
23. Chew v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
24. United States v.-Watson, 35 Fed. 358 (E. D. N. C. 1888).
25. 161 U. S. 306, 315 (1896).
26. Usury is a fertile field for fraud, even if it is assumed that it is not a fraud itself.
It is clearly a social injury. In this very case insurance fraud was practiced against (1) the
underwriters, (2) the borrowers, and (3) the mails were used to execute the wrong, to
return the instruments of fraud,--the notes, the lien instruments, the advices about insur-
ance and also to forward the working tools of charts, schedules and instructions to office
managers. The battle against usury is always hard, long and tedious. Victims are generally
unwilling to testify.
27. 1 STony, EQuTyr J E sPRuDENcE (13th ed. 1886) 306.
28. P. R. Mallory & Co. v. Grigsby-Grunow Co., 72 F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934);
Interstate Savings & Loan Assn. of Minneapolis v. Badgely, 115 Fed. 390 (C. C. A. 9th,
1902); Bruner v. Myers, et al., 212 Iowa 308, 233 N. W. 505, 506 (1930), modified 235
N. W. 726 (1931); Nelson v. Betts, 21 Mo. App. 219 (1886); Holmes v. Fresh, 9 Mo.
200 (1845). In Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 63 S. W. (2d) 3 (1933), the
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It is usually considered that an element of deception must be present
to constitute fraud under the Mail Fraud Statute. Nevertheless, in
Horman v. United States,29 no mention was made of deception when a
scheme to blackmail by employing the mails was condemned as a viola-
tion of tle statute. It was there stated:
"If the scheme or artifice in its necessary consequence is one which is calcu-
lated to injure another, to deprive him of his property wrongfully, then it is
to defraud within the meaning of the statute30 . . . 'deprive of something dis-
honestly' is to defraud." 31
The case of Hammerschmidt v. United States32 limited the Horman
decision by holding that the words "to defraud" did not include theft
by violence or robbery or burglary even though such acts might be con-
sidered "dishonest" under the Horman case reasoning. It was stated
that the Horman case went to the "verge".
Fasulo v. United States3  reiterated this position:
"A comprehensive definition of 'scheme or artifice to defraud' need not be
undertaken. The phrase is a broad one and extends to a great variety of
transactions. But broad as are the words 'to defraud' they do not include threat
and coercion through fear or force."
The Norton case34 retreated a bit more from the Horman position,
holding that "fear of injury to reputation or good name by threat to
publish a false accusation" is the same as fear of bodily harm by threats
of violence and, therefore, not covered by the statute. Dictum in this
opinion implies that intent to deceive is one of the requirements for
conviction.
In neither the Hammerscmidt case nor the Fasulo case however did
the United States Supreme Court condemn the Norman case because it
failed to require an element of deception for conviction under the Mail
Fraud Statute. In fact, it could be said that the Supreme Court purpose-
ly limited itself to excepting the threat and coercion situation from the
Horman decision when it would have been just as easy and more in
keeping with tradition to have differed on the basis of deception.
Kentucky court went back and invoked the ancient rules of the common law in order
to reach the usury racket and established new applications in its Jurisprudence in that
regard. In this connection see Combating the Loak Shark (1941) 8 LAW AND CONTEhMp.
PROB.
29. 116 Fed. 350 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902).
30. Id. at 352.
31. Id. at 354.
32. 265 U. S. 182 (1924).
33. 272 U. S. 620, 628 (1926).
34. Norton v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 753, 756 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
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PROSECUTING LOAN SHARKS
This consideration, added to the liberal attitude the courts have subse-
quently taken as to what constitutes fraud, as illustrated in the Groves
and Buckner cases, previously mentioned, leads one to venture the
thought that usury would be held to be fraud within the Mail Fraud
Statute if the proper factual situation were ever squarely presented to
the court. The view that usury is prohibited as a fraud within the
federal statute has been rejected by some on the ground that the laws
of the several states differ as to what constitutes usury and that, there-
fore, a loan shark's activity might be a federal crime in one district but
not in another. It is believed that such contention can be effectively met
by the consideration that the federal prosecutor and courts would only
consider the rate fraudulent when it was so unreasonable as to shock
the consciences of reasonable men.35 Then too practically all states
make usurious contracts void in part or in whole and efforts to effect
void contracts seem fraudulent.
But even if the Supreme Court should fail to so hold, prosecution of
the loan shark under the Mail Fraud Statute should not be too seriously
hampered. It is typical of the loan shark that he inevitably steps out
of bounds in an attempt to ensnare his prospective victims, much as
his deep sea counterpart must often turn over on its back to catch
the prey. If the usurer does not misrepresent his insurance practice or
his charges, he misrepresents the independence of his organization-or
his procedure in selecting his clients-or his investigation policy, or like
practices. These may well constitute a scheme for obtaining money
under false pretenses since any one of them may be the deciding factor
that leads a prospective borrower to select this one from many loan
companies. If these representations are made, and the mails are used,
the perpetrator making them, knowing them to be untrue and intending
to thus entice the victim, is using the mails to defraud.
In a recent lecture,36 Judge Moscowitz, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of New York, took occasion to criticize the use
that has been made of the Mail Fraud Statute, saying in substance it
was being twisted to apply to situations, i.e., larceny, arson, theft, etc.,
which were never contemplated by Congress when the Statute was
enacted.
Conceding there have been instances where the Statute has been mis-
applied, it is believed that the prosecution of the loan shark by means
35. In this connection see the indictment in United States v. King, (W. D. Tex. 1944)
at San Antonio, Docket No. 13147 and the accompanying news release of the United
States Attorney General.
36. Lecture before the Section, on Federal Practice of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, March 14, 1944.
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of the Mail Fraud Statute cannot be properly subjected to such criti-
cism. Judge Moscowitz stated that the original purpose of the statute
was to prevent illegal acts such as the sale of wildcat gold-mine stock
through the use of the mails in perpetration of such fraud. While the
loan shark may not be selling anything, nonetheless he is frequently
scheming to obtain the money of his victims through false representa-
tions just as does the vendor of wildcat gold-mine stocks and he some-
times does attain the results of his fraudulent objective by using the
mails for the perpetration of his fraud. If every statute and every state-
ment of legal principle were applied only to the precise problem en-
visaged by its proponents, Anglo-American law would be of considerably
less value.
Constant vigilance and ingenuity will be required in the near future
to control the growth and activities of the illegal money lender. Until
such time as state and small loan statutes with teeth are universally
available to law enforcement officers, it is suggested the Mail Fraud
Statute is the hypodermic harpoon which will land most of the loan
sharks in the approaching season.
